I shall now utter what amounts to heresy in current public
policy thinking. Getting the public’s input isn’t always a good thing. In fact,
it can often lead to paralysis. Why? Because no matter how good a project might
be, there will always be those who oppose it. Unfortunately, those
opponents usually are louder than those in favor of a project, even if they are
numerically weaker .
That’s because of the stronger motivation inherent in opposing
an initiative. Think for a moment: when
have you ever seen someone stage a protest in favor of a project? Now think
about the last time you heard of a lawsuit being filed to stop a project or, on
the more extreme end of the spectrum, someone chaining themselves to a tree to
stop a bulldozer.
That latter example comes from Atlanta, where the Presidential
Parkway was stopped mid-construction through a combination of protests and
lawsuits. The original plan, backed by former President Jimmy Carter and the
Georgia DOT, would have resulted in a limited access, elevated highway east of
downtown Atlanta. The impacted neighborhoods, many of which were undergoing the
initial stages of gentrification, fought against it with lawsuits and the
occasional protestor firmly attached to a tree.
The lawsuits were more successful at delaying construction,
but the protests gradually soured politicians’ attitudes towards the project.
Construction was cancelled and the Georgia DOT learned the hard way that
politicians prefer for problems to go away quietly, rather than become more
distracting over time. Today parkland and a grade-level boulevard named Freedom
Parkway fills a space that, for at least a few years, was an eerie world of
unused bridge supports rising like Roman ruins from the red Georgia clay.
These opponents were certainly helped along by the inherent
flaws in what was a wasteful project. After all, Atlanta’s expressways are little
more than multilane parking lots for several hours each workday. The
neighborhood this road would have bisected, Inman Park, later gentrified into
one of the most expensive in Atlanta. If an elevated, pollution-spewing
expressway had been built, would anyone have wanted to live near it? Probably
not.
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| A traffic jam in Atlanta. Would you want to live near this? Photo courtesy of Atlantacitizen/Wikipedia. |
Fair enough, but does an opposition lose when a project isn’t
so flawed? No, for on July 31st of 2012, voters in the Atlanta metro
area voted
against a local option sales tax (T-SPLOST) that would have paid for a vast
array of transportation projects. Most of that revenue (52%) would have gone to
new transit programs, but a lot would have gone to roads, too. While only
1% would have gone to bike and pedestrian facilities, it must be remembered
that such projects are fairly cheap, as I pointed out when I wrote about Complete
Streets Policies.
So, why did the opponents win in this case? Ironically, it
was the actions of the policymakers that ensured their victory. Georgia’s
elected and appointed officialdom opted for a funding option that required a
referendum. A referendum is the purest form of citizen input on policy, so a
win for the proposal would be inoculated both it and its sponsors against the
all-too-common charge that officials didn’t get enough feedback from the
public. But if you look at the assortment of special interest groups that
opposed it and why, a pattern emerges:
1.
The Sierra Club opposed it because too much
money was allocated to roads.
2.
The NAACP opposed it because not enough money
was being spent in poor, largely black portions of the area.
3.
The Georgia chapter of the Tea Party opposed it
because it was a tax increase, period.
See the pattern? The opponents were all taking purist
positions in line with the political agenda. Simple positions make for good soundbites in a
political fight.
On the other side were most major employers in Atlanta,
including Coca-Cola, plus various political figures such as the Mayor of
Atlanta, Kasim Reed, who was elected with strong support from the City’s
African-American electorate. They were comfortable with messy compromises, as this
proposal essentially was, because they operate in an environment that requires
compromise to function, i.e. the real world.
But compromises make lousy rallying cries. It’s much easier
to yell “No new taxes” than it is to yell “It’s not perfect, but what is?” In a
referendum contest, the motivated minority is going to vote; the apathetic
majority won’t, unless there’s something else bringing them to the polls. They
aren’t going to show up for a referendum or a boring primary in mid-summer. That’s
why T-SPLOST went “t-splat”.
So, are policymakers trapped? If they fail to consult the
public, are they doomed to suffer headline-grabbing protests and expensive
lawsuits? If they do ask for public input, will their plans always be derailed
by small groups of motivated opponents? No, but they can only avoid these fates
if they pay attention to conditions on the ground.
In the case of the Presidential Parkway, leaders failed to
recognize that entire neighborhoods were rebelling against their plans. Neighborhoods
can easily sway elections for city council, Mayor, or legislative seats because
of their concentration of votes. Officeholders facing such a hotbed of
hostility must either find a way to placate these constituents or start packing
up their offices.
Those who didn’t rely on electoral support from these areas,
such as Georgia DOT board members, failed to realize that their constituents were
those same officeholders that came under intense pressure from the
neighborhoods they represented. These elected officials weren’t going to stick
their necks out for a project that would cost them their office.
For the T-SPLOST issue, policymakers didn’t understand that
it’s not always a good idea to punt the ball. Stretching the football metaphor
further (this is Georgia we’re talking about, after all), the ball should have
been run, because the defense wasn’t deep. The opposition consisted of a few
special interest groups that could sway the outcome of an election if only
their motivated supporters showed up.
The bottom line is that policymakers need to pay attention
to how concentrated the opposition is. If it appears to be very concentrated
and strong, extensive public outreach isn’t a bad idea as it could save a lot
of time, money, and political embarrassment.
However, if the angry faces they see at public hearings and
meetings are the same ones seen at EVERY public hearing, regardless of the
topic, they may very well be looking at a scattered, weak opposition that doesn’t
have the backing of the public at large. That’s what happened in Georgia’s
referendum. Unfortunately, in the current skittish climate of public
policymaking, it’s a scenario that will likely play out repeatedly.



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